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Doublethink 
 
“War Is Peace” and “Freedom Is Slavery” 
1984, by George Orwell 
 
Academic freedom is furthered by allowing law schools to deny students 
the freedom to hear military recruiters’ viewpoint. 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Fair v. Rumsfeld 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. § 1983, requires the Secretary 
of Defense to withhold federal funds from any institution of higher 
learning which denies military recruiters access to the institution’s 
campus equal to the access afforded other employers. This statute has 
created a conflict between law schools and the military. Virtually all law 
schools have adopted a non-discrimination policy, mandated by the 
American Association of Law Schools (“AALS”), which prohibits any 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. The military, however, 
applies, as required by statute, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which 
precludes any non-closeted homosexual from military employment. 
Law schools sought federal court intervention to declare the 
Solomon Amendment unconstitutional. Their claim was that the 
Department of Defense violated the law schools’ free speech and free 
association constitutional rights by conditioning their receipt of federal 
funds on the requirement to associate with, and endorse, the military’s 
discriminatory employment policies—an endorsement they assert will 
flow from allowing the military to recruit under the law schools’ 
auspices. 
After the law schools’ application for a preliminary injunction 
against enforcement of the Solomon Amendment was denied in the 
district court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Forum for Academic 
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and Institutional Rights (“FAIR”) v. Rumsfeld, by a 2-1 split, in June 
2004, reversed and granted the preliminary injunction.1 The United 
States Supreme Court has granted the government’s application for 
certiorari,2 and will soon hear that appeal.3 
PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE 
This article does not evaluate the merits or shortcomings of the 
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Like it or not—there are able 
proponents and opponents of the policy—it is a policy enacted into 
statute by Congress and signed into law by President Clinton. And it has 
been upheld by each of the several courts that have been asked to declare 
it unconstitutional. The proper venue for questioning the advisability of 
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy thus is in Congress, not the courts. It 
is apparently in recognition of that reality that the plaintiffs in FAIR v. 
Rumsfeld do not raise, as an issue, the constitutionality of the “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. 
Given that reality, the issue addressed in this article is the 
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment. This article will 
demonstrate that the Solomon Amendment is a proper exercise of the 
Spending Clause by the federal government that is within the 
Constitution and does not violate the First Amendment rights—academic 
freedom—of law professors, law schools, and law students. 
This article will begin, in Part I, with the three promulgations which 
resulted in the clash of views and, ultimately, the FAIR v. Rumsfeld 
lawsuit: the text of the Solomon Amendment and its legislative history; 
the text of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” statute, and then the text and 
relevant history of the law schools’ non-discrimination policy which the 
law schools assert they would be required to violate if military recruiters 
were allowed on-campus access to students. In Part II, this article will 
review the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
FAIR v. Rumsfeld. 
Part III will examine “academic freedom” arguments that have been 
advanced by opponents of the Solomon Amendment and demonstrate 
that allowing military recruiters onto law school campuses would be 
more consistent with the principles of “academic freedom.” Part IV will 
show that the Solomon Amendment is within the federal government’s 
powers under the Spending Clause. Part V will argue that the 
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment should be subject to a 
                                                                                                             
 1 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 
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 2 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005). 
 3 Oral arguments are scheduled for Tuesday, December 6, 2005. 
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standard of intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny as was 
applied by the Third Circuit. 
I. STATUTES/LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND LAW SCHOOL POLICIES 
A. The Solomon Amendment 
The Solomon Amendment in its current form, codified in 10 U.S.C. 
§ 983, reads: 
(b) Denial of funds for preventing military recruiting on 
campus.—No funds described in subsection (d)(1) may be 
provided by contract or by grant to an institution of higher 
education (including any subelement of such institution) if the 
Secretary of Defense determines that that institution (or any 
subelement of that institution) has a policy or practice (regardless 
of when implemented) that either prohibits, or in effect 
prevents— 
(1) the Secretary of a military department or Secretary 
of Homeland Security from gaining access to 
campuses, or access to students (who are 17 years of 
age or older) on campuses, for purposes of military 
recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality 
and scope to the access to campuses and to students 
that is provided to any other employer. . . . 
. . . . 
(c) Exceptions.—The limitation established in subsection (a) or 
(b) shall not apply to an institution of higher education (or any 
subelement of that institution) if the Secretary of Defense 
determines that— 
(1) the institution (and each subelement of that 
institution) has ceased the policy or practice described 
in that subsection; or 
(2) the institution of higher education involved has a 
longstanding policy of pacifism based on historical 
religious affiliation. 
(d) Covered funds.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
the limitations established in subsections (a) and (b) apply to the 
following: 
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(A) Any funds made available for the Department of 
Defense. 
(B) Any funds made available for any department or 
agency for which regular appropriations are made in a 
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, 
and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act. 
(C) Any funds made available for the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
(D) Any funds made available for the National 
Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of 
Energy. 
(E) Any funds made available for the Department of 
Transportation. 
(F) Any funds made available for the Central 
Intelligence Agency. 
(2) Any federal funding specified in paragraph (1) 
that is provided to an institution of higher education, 
or to an individual, to be available solely for student 
financial assistance, related administrative costs, or 
costs associated with attendance, may be used for the 
purpose for which the funding is provided. 
The Solomon Amendment was first proposed in the Spring of 1994 
by Congressman Gerald B. Solomon, from whom the amendment takes 
its common name. Solomon proposed the bill as a means to solve the 
problem facing the military as a result of the concerted action by colleges 
and universities across the country to prohibit military recruiters on 
campus. Solomon recognized that these same institutions were more than 
willing to accept research grants and other funding from the Pentagon.4 
The bill sought to gain access to college campuses for military recruiters 
by conditioning the award of Pentagon funds on the institutions allowing 
access to military recruiters. According to the legislative history, the 
purpose of the Solomon Amendment was to “not give taxpayer dollars to 
institutions . . . interfering with the federal government’s constitutionally 
mandated function of raising a military,” while increasing the numbers 
recruited of “the most highly qualified candidates from around the 
country.”5 Rep. Solomon made clear that his purpose was not to violate 
any school’s academic freedom, as the Solomon Amendment left all 
schools free to deny military recruiters access to their campus, but the 
federal government then could withhold federal funding. He stated: 
                                                                                                             
 4 140 CONG. REC. H3861 (daily ed. May 23, 1994). 
 5 141 CONG. REC. E13-01 (Jan. 4, 1995). 
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Tell recipients of Federal money at colleges and universities that 
if you do not like the Armed Forces, if you do not like its 
policies, that is fine. That is your First Amendment right. But do 
not expect Federal dollars to support your interference with our 
military recruiters.6 
More recently, the House Committee report, in support of the 2004 
Amendment, made clear that the purpose of the Solomon Amendment 
was to ensure a strong military: 
[A]t no time since World War II, has our Nation’s freedom and 
security relied more upon our military than now as we engage in 
the global war on terrorism. Our Nation’s all volunteer armed 
services have been called upon to serve and they are performing 
their mission at the highest standard. The military’s ability to 
perform at this standard can only be maintained with effective 
and uninhibited recruitment programs. Successful recruitment 
relies heavily upon the ability of military recruiters to have 
access to students on the campuses of colleges and universities 
that is equal to other employers.7 
The Solomon Amendment, in its original form, was enacted and 
signed into law by President Clinton in April 1994.8 Originally the 
Solomon Amendment applied only to Department of Defense funds 
granted to the particular subelement of a school, e.g., the law school, that 
prohibited military recruiting, not the entire school.9 As a practical 
matter, this original Solomon Amendment had little bark and no bite. 
Since law schools generally did not receive much funding through the 
Department of Defense, it did not stop most law schools from continuing 
to bar military recruiters from their campuses. And it had little, if any, 
effect on the parent institutions, who were the major recipients of 
Department of Defense funding, because their Department of Defense 
funding was not withheld when a subelement, such as its law school, 
blocked military recruiting. 
In response to the continued law school prohibition of military 
recruiters, Congress, in 1997, amended the Solomon Amendment to 
include Departments of Transportation, Labor, Health and Human 
Services, and Education funding within the grants and contracts which 
the Secretary of Defense was to withhold when an institution prohibited 
                                                                                                             
 6 140 CONG. REC. H3861 (daily ed. May 23, 1994). 
 7 H.R. REP. NO. 108-443(I), at 3-4 (2004). 
 8 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 
558, 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994). 
 9 Id. at § 558. 
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military recruiters from recruiting on campus.10 While the Solomon 
Amendment, with this revision, continued to have an impact only on the 
specific part of a university which barred military recruiters, usually the 
law school, this change authorized the Secretary of Defense to withhold 
federal financial aid from law school students.11 This latter threat led 
many law schools to except the military from the nondiscrimination 
policy or abandon it altogether.12 
In 1999, the Frank-Campbell Amendment was passed, altering the 
Solomon Amendment to exclude any impact on financial aid funds or 
related administrative costs.13 This resulted in many of the law schools 
readopting, and again enforcing, their nondiscrimination policies, 
prohibiting the military from recruiting on campus. 
In 2000, interim regulations were adopted defining “institution” as 
including subelements, which meant that, if a subelement, e.g., the law 
school, of a school prohibited military recruiters from recruiting on 
campus, federal funds were to be withheld from the entire school.14 
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the government 
recognized an increased need for the nation’s best men and women to 
join the military. Strict enforcement of the Solomon Amendment 
occurred. The interim regulations were made final in 2003. Schools were 
threatened with loss of federal funds on evidence of “outright bans, 
prohibitions against recruiting in law school buildings, and other limits 
on military recruiters that are more restrictive than for private law 
firms.”15 It had the impact which the Solomon Amendment intended: 
most schools which had previously discriminated against military 
recruiters suddenly renounced the supposed principle of non-
discrimination in favor of the other spelling of principal—meaning 
money—and allowed equal access to military recruiters. 
Unable to overcome the practical constraints of the Solomon 
Amendment, most schools then took the government to court, claiming 
the Solomon Amendment violated their First Amendment Rights.16 That 
lawsuit resulted in the Third Circuit’s decision in FAIR v. Rumsfeld, and 
                                                                                                             
 10 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 
514(b), 110 Stat. 3009-270 (1996). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Lindsay Gayle Stevenson, Note, Military Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual 
Orientation: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the Solomon Amendment, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1331, 1352 (2004). 
 13 Act of Oct. 25, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-79, § 8120, 113 Stat. 1212, 1260. 
 14 See 48 C.F.R. § 209.470-1 (2000). 
 15 Patrick Healy, Despite Concerns, Law Schools Admit Military Recruiters, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Nov. 12, 2002, at A1, available at http://www.lawschool100.com/campus 
military.htm. 
 16 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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will culminate in a Supreme Court opinion later this Supreme Court 
term. 
B. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
In 1993, Congress enacted, and President Clinton signed into law, 
10 U.S.C. § 654, what is commonly known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” policy, making into binding law what had been military policy 
concerning homosexuals in the military: 
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed 
forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if 
one or more of the following findings is made . . . . 
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or 
solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . . . 
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or 
bisexual, or words to that effect . . . . 
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a person 
known to be of the same biological sex. . . .17 
C. Law Schools’ Non-Discrimination Policies 
For many years, the AALS, an association of more than 160 law 
schools, has mandated a non-discrimination policy for its member law 
schools. Originally, that policy did not cover sexual orientation, but 
prohibited discrimination on what were then the recognized subjects for 
opposition to discrimination: national origin, religion, gender, race, 
ethnicity, marital status, parental status, veteran status, physical status 
and age. Some law schools, on their own, added sexual orientation as a 
protected category in the late 1970s and thereafter.18 
Virtually every law school in this country revised their non-
discrimination policy to add sexual orientation, when, in 1990, the AALS 
did so. Law school non-discrimination policies through the current time 
typically use the following or very similar language, committing the law 
school “to a policy against discrimination based upon age, color, 
handicap or disability, ethnic or national origin, race, religion, religious 
                                                                                                             
 17 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 
571(b), 107 Stat. 1547, 1671-72 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000)). 
 18 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 280 (D.N.J. 2003). 
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creed, gender (including discrimination taking the form of sexual 
harassment, marital, parental or veteran status, or sexual orientation).”19 
Prior to the inclusion of sexual orientation, the military in fact was 
in violation of the law schools’ policies against discrimination based on 
age and disability, given that the military will not accept recruits who are 
older than 34 for active duty and 39 for reserve duty, nor recruits who are 
not able bodied.20 Significantly, there is no report—even through the 
current time—of any law school barring military recruiters because of 
age or disability discrimination in violation of the law school’s non-
discrimination policies. The battle lines between the military and law 
schools, on the subject of violation of law schools’ non-discrimination 
policies, were only drawn when sexual orientation was added as a 
protected category. 
II. FORUM FOR ACADEMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS V. RUMSFELD 
Beginning in the 1980s, certain law schools began prohibiting 
military recruiters access to their campuses for violating their 
nondiscrimination policies.21 The passage of the Solomon Amendment in 
1994 created a major conflict between the government and the law 
schools. As the Solomon Amendment was amended, the amount of 
government funding that the Secretary of Defense could withhold from 
law schools increased as the Secretary was commanded by statute to 
withhold monies from other departments and then withhold monies from 
the parent institution for any discrimination against military recruiters by 
a subelement law school.22 Prior to September 11, 2001—in an apparent 
attempt by the government to avoid a confrontation—law schools were 
not denied federal funds if they accommodated military recruiters by 
merely granting them access to their campuses without giving them the 
full support and aid in scheduling interviews that was given to employers 
which did not violate the law schools’ nondiscrimination policies.23 After 
9/11, however, the Department of Defense began requiring that law 
schools grant military recruiters the same treatment as given to private 
employers. 
In 2004, Congress codified this practice into the Solomon 
Amendment, amending the statute to penalize law schools and their 
parent institutions for failing to provide military recruiters access “in a 
                                                                                                             
 19 Id. 
 20 U.S. Army Careers & Jobs, http://www.goarmy.com/JobCatList.do?fw=career 
index (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
 21 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 225. 
 22 Id. at 226-27. 
 23 Id. at 227. 
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manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to 
campuses and students that is provided to any other employer.”24 In 
response, FAIR and a few other organizations and individuals sued the 
Department of Defense and other government departments, claiming that 
the policy violated the First Amendment rights of the law schools, and 
sought a preliminary injunction. 
A. The Parties 
1. The Plaintiffs 
The plaintiffs were FAIR, the Society of American Law Teachers, 
Inc., the Coalition for Equality, a Boston College Law School student 
group, Rutgers Gay and Lesbian Caucus, two law professors and three 
law students.25 
FAIR members were law schools and entire law faculties that voted 
to join FAIR.26 Initially all of the members of FAIR were anonymous, 
and declined to disclose their identity. To meet the Government’s motion 
to dismiss on lack of standing—to sustain FAIR’s standing would require 
a finding that members of the plaintiff association individually “would 
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right”27—FAIR first 
submitted the FAIR membership list for the court’s in camera review, 
i.e., without disclosing the identity of any individual member to 
defendants.28 In the end, FAIR amended its complaint to identify two of 
its members, a law school and the faculty of another, which was held 
“sufficient to establish that FAIR members have standing in their own 
right to bring this action.”29 
2. The Defendants 
Named defendants were the respective cabinet Secretaries of the 
Departments of Defense, Education, Labor, Health and Human Services, 
Transportation, and Homeland Security.30 
                                                                                                             
 24 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911 (2004) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 983). 
 25 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 274 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 26 Id. at 286. 
 27 Id. at 285. 
 28 Id. at 286 n.6. 
 29 Id. at 289. 
 30 Id. at 276. 
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B. District Court Decision 
The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunction as well as the government’s motion to dismiss on ground of 
plaintiffs’ lack of standing.31 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
then heard the appeal. 
C. Third Circuit Decision 
1. Majority Opinion 
Two members of the three-judge Third Circuit panel held that 
“FAIR . . . demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its First 
Amendment claims and that it is entitled to preliminary injunctive 
relief,” reversing the district court’s decision.32 The majority opinion in 
FAIR found that the Solomon Amendment violated the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine by impairing the First Amendment rights of the law 
schools.33 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that the 
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes 
his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in 
freedom of speech.”34 
The majority decision in FAIR pursued two avenues of analysis in 
determining whether the Solomon Amendment violates the First 
Amendment interests of the law schools. First, the court considered 
whether the law schools constitute “‘expressive associations’ whose First 
Amendment right to disseminate their chosen message is impaired by the 
inclusion of military recruiters on their campuses.”35 Then, the court 
considered whether “the law schools are insulated by free speech 
protections from being compelled to assist military recruiters in the 
expressive act of recruiting.”36 The Third Circuit applied strict scrutiny 
(“A regulation . . . must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest, and must use the least restrictive means of 
promoting the Government’s asserted interest”) rather than intermediate 
scrutiny (regulation constitutional if it “furthers an important government 
interest that would be achieved less effectively without that action”), 
though in the decision the court states that the outcome would be the 
same under either scrutiny standard.37 The reasoning in the majority 
                                                                                                             
 31 Id. at 322. 
 32 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 33 See id. at 229-30. 
 34 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
 35 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 230. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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decision will be explained here and responded to in the later sections of 
this article. 
a. Expressive Association Analysis 
The majority applied the elements of an expressive association 
claim as set forth in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale:38 (1) whether the 
group is an “expressive association;” (2) whether the state action 
significantly affects the group’s ability to advocate its viewpoint, and (3) 
whether the state’s interest justifies any burden it imposes on the group’s 
expressive association.39 First, the majority relied on Dale for the rule 
that a group does not need to exist for the sole purpose of expression to 
be considered an “expressive association.”40 In Dale, the Supreme Court 
determined the Boy Scouts of America to be an expressive association, 
because it “seeks to transmit . . . a system of values [and] engages in 
expressive activity.”41 The Third Circuit determined that educational 
institutions are similarly an expressive association because one of their 
purposes is to instill a system of values in their students.42 
The court then examined whether the Solomon Amendment affects 
the law schools’ ability to advocate its point of view. Applying its 
reading of Dale, the court reasoned that, just as forcing the Boy Scouts to 
allow an openly gay scout master would force the Boy Scouts to send a 
message that they accept homosexual behavior, contrary to the Scout 
Oath, “the presence of military recruiters would, at the very least, force 
law schools to send a message both to students and the legal community, 
that the law schools accept employment discrimination as a legitimate 
form of behavior.”43 The Third Circuit rejected the district court’s 
argument that there is a difference between forced inclusion within a 
group and the forced periodic presence at a group’s location, finding that 
the duration of a burden is not determinative of whether a constitutional 
violation has occurred.44 The court concluded that FAIR satisfied the 
second element of the unconstitutional conditions claim, because FAIR 
offered evidence of their belief that the Solomon Amendment impaired 
their ability to present their message, and the court must “‘give deference 
to an association’s view of what would impair its expression.’”45 
                                                                                                             
 38 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 39 Id. at 648-49. 
 40 Id. at 648. 
 41 Id. at 650. 
 42 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 231. 
 43 Id. at 232 (internal quotes omitted). 
 44 See id. at 233. 
 45 Id. at 233 (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 653). 
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The Third Circuit then moved on to the third step of the expressive 
association claim established in Dale, applying a balancing of the First 
Amendment interests affected by the Solomon Amendment with the 
government’s interests, to determine whether the statute violates the 
Constitution. The Third Circuit did not dispute that the government has a 
compelling interest in recruiting talented students to be military 
lawyers.46 The district court had determined that intermediate scrutiny 
applied, because it found the Solomon Amendment did not directly 
burden expressive association rights, but the Third Circuit found that the 
Solomon Amendment does in fact directly impair the law schools’ 
expression and applied strict scrutiny.47 The Third Circuit found that the 
Solomon Amendment could not be tailored much more broadly, citing 
examples such as television and radio advertisements as alternatives to 
recruiting directly on campus.48 The availability of less-restrictive means 
alone made the Solomon Amendment unconstitutional under strict 
scrutiny analysis, but the Third Circuit also asserted that the 
government’s failure to produce any evidence, demonstrating that a 
lesser restriction would not achieve the government’s goal of attracting 
talented military lawyers, caused the Solomon Amendment to be 
unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny as well.49 
The Third Circuit concluded that FAIR’s claim satisfied the 
requirements of an expressive association claim, warranting a 
preliminary injunction against the government’s enforcement of the 
Solomon Amendment, because FAIR had a “reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits of its expressive association claim against the 
Solomon Amendment.”50 
b. Compelled Speech Analysis 
The Third Circuit then pursued a second avenue of analysis, 
determining that, in violation of the First Amendment, the Solomon 
Amendment compels the law schools to express the government’s views. 
The compelled speech doctrine is said to prohibit the government from 
forcing a private speaker to advance a message dictated by the 
government,51 forcing a private speaker to include another private 
                                                                                                             
 46 Id. at 234. 
 47 Id. at 234 n.14. 
 48 Id. at 234-35. 
 49 Id. at 245. 
 50 Id. at 235. 
 51 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). 
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speaker’s message,52 or forcing an entity or individual to subsidize an 
organization that promotes speech that the entity or individual opposes.53 
The Third Circuit concluded that the Solomon Amendment violated all 
of these three asserted prohibitions of the compelled speech doctrine. 
In order for the Solomon Amendment to violate the compelled 
speech doctrine, recruiting must constitute speech. The Third Circuit 
found that recruiting is a form of expression, because of the “oral and 
written communication that recruiting entails . . . [and] its purpose—to 
convince prospective employees that an employer is worth working 
for.”54 (The majority opinion did not even consider whether the law 
schools, in asserted support of the schools’ academic freedom, were in 
fact violating the academic freedom of all students, by prohibiting them 
from listening to, on campus, the views expressed by military recruiters.) 
The Third Circuit majority stated that the Solomon Amendment compels 
law schools to endorse speech from the military, and thereby promote an 
employer with whose discriminatory policies the law schools disagree.55 
It concluded that this is compelled expression “in all three proscribed 
ways: propagation, accommodation, and subsidy,” because the law 
schools must promote the military’s message by allowing them to recruit 
on campus, accommodate the military’s message by allowing them on 
campus, and subsidize the military’s message by using career services 
staff to assist the military in getting its message to the students.56 
The majority opinion gave no weight to FAIR’s factual admissions 
that the AALS had suggested that law schools engage in ameliorative 
measures, which would make clear that they oppose the military policy, 
to avoid any appearance of law schools’ endorsement of the military’s 
discriminatory policy. Those measures included informing students that 
“the military discriminates on a basis not permitted by the school’s non-
discrimination rules,” and scheduling “forums or panels for the 
discussion of the military policy . . . .”57 The majority also appeared to 
have ignored its own finding that “the record is replete with references to 
student protesters and public condemnation,”58 as well as its record 
recitations of law school “administrators, faculty and students” 
criticizing military policies while military recruiters were on campus.59 
                                                                                                             
 52 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557, 581 (1995). 
 53 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977). 
 54 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 236-37. 
 55 Id. at 236. 
 56 Id. at 239-40. 
 57 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 281 (quoting Rosenkranz Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 3). 
 58 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 245. 
 59 Id. at 239. 
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Despite these facts and holdings, the Third Circuit questioned 
whether the Solomon Amendment prohibits disclaimers, even though it 
is clear that law schools are entitled to disclaim and even protest the 
military recruiters’ presence on campus—and despite the fact that the 
government, in its brief to the Third Circuit, expressly recognized a law 
school’s right publicly to disagree with the military. The Third Circuit 
concluded that the law schools’ freedom to express their opposing view 
is irrelevant because “compelled speech concerns [do not] evaporate if a 
speaker can ameliorate the risk of misattribution by disclaiming the 
message it is being compelled to propagate.”60 
The Third Circuit acknowledged that, even if the Solomon 
Amendment does impair the First Amendment rights of law schools by 
compelling speech, the statute would still be valid if it survives 
scrutiny.61 But the Third Circuit determined that the Solomon 
Amendment does not survive strict scrutiny, which it chose as the correct 
standard, or even intermediate scrutiny because the Government failed to 
show that it cannot recruit effectively without on-campus recruiting, or 
that it would recruit less effectively by less speech-restrictive means.62 
2. Dissent 
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Aldisert would affirm the decision of 
the district court.63 Contending that this case is not “a case of First 
Amendment protection in the nude,”64 he identified three controlling 
issues: (1) whether FAIR “overcom[es] the presumption of 
constitutionality of a congressional statute that is . . . bottomed on the 
Spending Clause;” (2) whether the law schools’ nondiscrimination 
policies are violated by a military recruiter temporarily being present on 
campus; and (3) whether, after applying the balancing test, “it can be 
concluded that the operation of the First Amendment trumps the several 
clauses of Articles I and II relating to the spending power and support of 
the military.”65 
The dissent began with the recognized presumption that 
congressional statutes are constitutional,66 citing the decision in Rust v. 
Sullivan67 which states: “As between two possible interpretations of a 
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statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other 
valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which would save the Act.”68 While 
the majority may literally be correct in disputing that anyone had raised 
two interpretations of the Solomon Amendment,69 the dissent’s point is 
not that the court should adopt a constitutional interpretation of the 
Solomon Amendment, but that the amendment itself is presumed 
constitutional unless the objectants first “demonstrate that the mere 
presence of recruiting officers on campus constitutes a compellable 
inference that the law schools will be objectively and reasonably viewed 
as violating their anti-discrimination policies.”70 Even if FAIR had 
produced such evidence, the dissent explained that it would then have to 
demonstrate that the infringement on law schools’ First Amendment 
rights outweighed Congressional interests reflected in provisions of 
Article I of the Constitution.71 
The dissent argued that the majority failed to take into 
consideration many constitutional provisions that support the 
government’s interests advanced by the Solomon Amendment and that 
predate the adoption of the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights.72 The 
dissent cited the Spending Power Clause, which granted “Congress . . . 
the Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . to . . . provide for the common 
Defense and general Welfare of the United States . . .”73 and the Military 
Powers Clause which granted Congress the power “to raise and support 
Armies . . . to provide and maintain a Navy . . . [and] to make Rules for 
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.”74 And the 
dissent referenced the Necessary and Proper Clause, authorizing 
Congress “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department or Officer thereof.”75 
Referring to these provisions, the dissent asserted that there is no 
case in which an act of Congress intended to support the military was 
declared unconstitutional by “application of the seminal doctrine that the 
government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes 
his constitutionally protected interests.”76 The dissent’s conclusion was 
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that, by reversing the district court decision on these grounds, the Third 
Circuit had essentially created new law that is not supported by 
precedent.77 
The dissent first questioned whether the impact of the Solomon 
Amendment on law schools’ First Amendment rights—the right not to 
appear to be violating their anti-discrimination policy—is even relevant, 
because a military recruiter on campus for a few days cannot allow such 
an inference.78 However, assuming such an inference were possible, the 
dissent addressed whether any “First Amendment concerns trump” 
Congress’ adoption of the Solomon Amendment in furtherance of its 
performance of its and the President’s duties “under Article I and II to 
support the military.”79 The dissent started by citing Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees,80 which held that “‘[t]he right to associate for expressive 
purposes is not . . . absolute,’” where there are “‘compelling state 
interests, unrelated to the suppression of idea, that cannot be achieved 
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.’”81 
The dissent identified the two “competing interests” that have to be 
balanced: the “interest in public safety [as] expressed in clauses of 
Articles I and II of the Constitution relating to support of the military” 
and “the interest in free speech [as] found in the First Amendment.”82 
In applying this balancing test, the dissent pointed out that the 
Supreme Court has “consistently deferred to congressional decisions 
relating to the military” due to the broad constitutional powers delegated 
to Congress and the lack of competence of the courts in determining such 
issues.83 Considering the arguments advanced by FAIR that the military 
could attract their candidates without stepping on the campus, the dissent 
explained that this is not in harmony with the concepts of a level playing 
field, since private law firms, who have resources available comparable 
to the military, yet are more attractive due to their higher pay and 
bonuses, are afforded complete access on campus.84 Because the military 
will inevitably be damaged in its recruiting pursuits without access to 
law school campuses, the dissent concluded that the balance was in favor 
of the Solomon Amendment, particularly, because “‘the validity of such 
regulations does not turn on a judge’s agreement with the responsible 
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decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting 
significant government interests.’”85 
a. Compelled Speech Claim86 
Turning to FAIR’s compelled speech claim, the dissent rejected 
FAIR’s reliance on Hurley, reasoning that “nothing in Hurley suggests 
that the Solomon Amendment crosses the line into unconstitutionality.”87 
The dissent argued that recruiting, though it involves speaking, is more 
of an economic transaction; “the expression is entirely subordinate to the 
transaction itself.”88 Also, the dissent explained that, in Hurley, the 
Supreme Court had found that the group sought to march “‘as a way to 
express pride in . . . [being] openly gay, lesbian and bisexual 
individuals’”—i.e., to convey a pro-homosexuality message.89 Further, 
its participation in the parade “‘would likely be perceived as having 
resulted from the [parade organizers’] customary determination about a 
unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of presentation 
and quite possibly of support as well,’” because the “‘role of the parade 
organizers . . . consisted of choosing the messages that would comprise 
the parade,’” suggesting that the message of a chosen marching group 
“would be attributed to the organizers themselves.”90 
The dissent pointed out that in FAIR, unlike Hurley, the expression 
is a subsidiary part of the activity, whereas in Hurley the expression (the 
parade) was the activity.91 It contrasted “bystanders watching a passing 
parade,” with “law school students and . . . their professors [who] are an 
extraordinarily sophisticated and well-informed group” who would not 
likely “perceive a military recruiter’s on-campus activities as reflecting 
the school’s . . . determination” that it gives a stamp of approval to the 
military’s message.92 Further, the “likelihood that the military’s 
recruiting will be seen as part of a law school’s own message is 
particularly small when schools can take—and have taken—ameliorative 
steps to publicize their continuing disagreement with the military’s 
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policies . . . .”93 The dissent concluded that the holding in Hurley did not 
apply to prevent judicial deference to Congress on military matters.94 
b. Expressive Association Claim 
The dissent then responded to the majority’s finding of merit in 
FAIR’s expressive association claim. The dissent explained that, while 
the First Amendment does protect expressive associations, “the Supreme 
Court has required a close relationship between the [government] action 
and the affected expressive activity to find a constitutional violation.”95 
The dissent found that the impact of the Solomon Amendment on the law 
schools’ interests of expression to be extremely remote and not to violate 
the First Amendment.96 Applying the balancing test, the government’s 
interests present in the Solomon Amendment outweigh the remote and 
incidental infringements on the First Amendment rights of the law 
schools.97 
The dissent dissected the cases relied on by the majority to show 
that they are inapposite to the issue of military recruiters. The dissent 
explained that those cases involved governmental requirements that 
private entities or persons pay for someone else’s speech or 
advertisements,98 whereas the Solomon Amendment does not require law 
schools to pay anything to the government.99 Further, the dissent 
explained that, even if the schools were required to give payments to the 
government to support the military’s recruiting efforts, there was 
precedent to allow more latitude for compelled support of government 
speech than private speech.100 
 
*   *   * 
 
This article will now examine in some detail criticisms of the 
majority decision, expanding on some of the arguments found in the 
dissent, and advancing other arguments for the conclusion that the 
Solomon Amendment was improperly determined to violate the 
Constitution in FAIR v. Rumsfeld. 
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III. THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT FURTHERS — DOES NOT VIOLATE — 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
The sine qua non of the Third Circuit majority decision is that the 
Solomon Amendment violates the law schools’ academic freedom – the 
protection afforded by the First Amendment to school communities. It is 
only that conclusion that allowed the Third Circuit to hold the Solomon 
Amendment unconstitutional as violating academic freedom. If it did not 
violate academic freedom, the Solomon Amendment must be held to be 
constitutional. 
In fact, the Solomon Amendment enhances academic freedom, 
rather than violating it. The Solomon Amendment uses the power of the 
federal purse to require law schools to allow students on campus the 
freedom to hear the message of military recruiters to the same extent they 
are permitted to hear the message of other recruiters. The law schools 
seek to continue to exclude military recruiters—i.e., not permit students 
the option to hear their message—because the law schools do not agree 
with the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. 
The law schools assert that their reason for excluding military 
recruiters is that military qualifications for employment, i.e., the “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, require rejection of gay people, and thus 
violates the law schools’ non-discriminatory policy which bars 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
Even if that were an accurate representation of the law schools’ 
motive, it would only mean that the law schools seek to impede military 
recruiters, who represent a view different from the law schools’ view on 
the usefulness of gay persons to the military, from expressing the 
military’s view to students who wish to hear it. The law schools’ non-
discrimination policy, to the extent it expresses the law schools’ opinion 
on that issue, is nothing more than just that—its expression of its opinion 
on an issue on which students are entitled to disagree, if academic 
freedom has any meaning. Unlike some of the other categories included 
in the law schools’ non-discrimination policy (e.g., discrimination based 
on race), which are designated by statute as illegal, the military’s “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy is not only not proscribed by law, but has been 
enacted by Congress, signed into law by President Clinton,101 and upheld 
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by each of the courts102 that have considered an attack on its 
constitutionality.103 
While not directly relevant, there are circumstances that strongly 
suggest that the law schools, in their opposition to military recruiters, are 
merely attempting to create pressure on the government to revoke the 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, and not because the law schools are 
seeking to prevent violation of their non-discrimination policies. As 
already discussed,104 law schools’ non-discrimination policies purport 
also to preclude employers who discriminate on the basis of “age” and 
“handicap or disability.” Although the military will not accept recruits 
older than 34 for active duty,105 and those who are not able-bodied106 
(obvious “violations” of law schools’ non-discrimination policies), no 
law school has cited those violations as a reason for excluding military 
recruiters. The apparent reason: acceptance that the military can exercise 
its judgment to decide that over-age and disabled persons are not 
consistent with an efficiently performing military. But law schools refuse 
to accept the judgment of the military (and Congress) that gays are not 
consistent with an efficiently performing military. What is the 
difference? Clearly the answer is that equal treatment of gays is a front-
burner politically-correct issue. Looked at in that manner, all law schools 
have the right to demonstrate and lobby Congress for a change in 
military policy towards gays, but those who disagree have an equal right 
to express themselves—including by listening to the message of military 
recruiters on campus. 
The law schools’ and the Third Circuit’s claim that the Solomon 
Amendment violates academic freedom by requiring law schools to 
allow military recruiters on campus makes a mockery of academic 
freedom (Freedom of Speech) as defined by the Supreme Court.107 The 
                                                                                                             
 102 See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 
F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 
915 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 (1996). 
 103 This view is not inconsistent with university administrators’ responsibility to 
exercise appropriate authority over student actions to prevent illegal or other disruptive 
conduct on campus. Military recruiters on campus does not fit within such conduct. 
 104 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 105 U.S. Army Careers & Jobs, http://www.goarmy.com/JobCatList.do?fw=career 
index (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Most of the defining of academic freedom has been done by the courts in the 
context of state action, including state schools. While non-state schools may well have 
the right to violate the academic freedom of their students, as the Civil Rights statutes in 
this context apply only to state action, these cases provide the courts’ definition of 
academic freedom. That definition must be applied to determine if there is any merit to 
the law schools’ assertion of violation of academic freedom by the Solomon Amendment. 
 
22 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 2:001 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an essential element of the First 
Amendment is the right to “‘receive information and ideas’”108—the very 
right the law schools wish to withhold from students by preventing 
students from hearing the military “information and ideas” on campus. 
This freedom to receive information that a person wishes to hear “is a 
necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own 
rights of speech, press and political freedom.”109 And “[a]t the heart of 
the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for 
him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, 
consideration, and adherence.”110 No reason exists to exclude from that 
First Amendment protection the law students’ right to “decide for 
himself or herself” whether the military recruiter’s message is “deserving 
of expression, consideration and” acceptance.111 
As the Supreme Court recognized, “this right is ‘nowhere more 
vital’ than in our schools and universities. The college classroom with its 
surrounding environs is particularly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’”112 which 
is at the heart of academic freedom.113 A marketplace of ideas requires a 
“wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 
‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of 
authoritative selection.’”114 The objective is that “students must always 
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate . . . .”115 “In our system, 
students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that 
which the [school] chooses to communicate. They may not be confined 
to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.”116 
Based on these Supreme Court definitions of academic freedom, it 
is clear that what the law schools are asking the courts to permit is the 
opposite of academic freedom. The law schools seek to deny students the 
option to hear the military recruiters’ “information and ideas,” deny 
military recruiters access to the “market place of ideas” on campus, and 
deny students the freedom to “inquire” of military recruiters, to “study” 
the military recruiters’ message, and “to evaluate” those ideas. 
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The law schools’ position that they have the right to protect their 
academic freedom against being forced to associate with military 
recruiters and military policies is meritless. Assuming arguendo117 that 
law schools, qua institutions, are forced to associate with military 
recruiters, it would not alter the reality that academic freedom is 
enhanced by protecting the students’ right to hear the military message, if 
they choose to do so. 
Simply put, what the law schools assert is that, because they do not 
agree with the military’s policy, they have a right to prevent students 
who wish to hear the military’s message to do so. It is axiomatic that it is 
the antithesis of academic freedom for one group of students and faculty 
members (the FAIR plaintiffs) to prevent the dissemination of a message 
that other students wish to hear, merely because the FAIR plaintiffs 
disagree with the message. 
At the heart of the fallacy inherent in the law schools’ position is 
that they see academic freedom as primarily for the benefit of 
administration and faculty (and those students who agree with the 
administration), with academic freedom of students restrictable through 
administration-proclaimed self-serving definitions of politically correct 
and acceptable forms of thought and speech designed to limit free 
expression on campus. To the contrary, academic freedom is not the 
exclusive property of law school administrations and some group of 
faculty members. Colleges exist for the education of students, with 
students being the primary beneficiaries of academic freedom. The law 
school administrations are the fiduciaries of that right, with the duty to 
implement it for the benefit of the students. 
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 
26 v. Pico,118 provides precedent for how FAIR should have been 
decided. In that case, the Supreme Court recognized that schools have a 
right to establish their curriculum in furtherance of their “‘legitimate . . . 
interest in promoting . . . values be they social, moral, or political’” on 
their students without interference from the government.119 This is 
analogous to FAIR’s arguments regarding the law schools’ right to 
disseminate a message against the military’s discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation. But significantly, in Pico, the Supreme Court did 
not extend the school’s right to control curriculum to the content of the 
library. The Court distinguished between the classroom and the library. 
The library was for voluntary exposure to speech, whereas the classroom 
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curriculum was mandated by the school. Because library “books . . . by 
their nature are optional rather than required reading” for students, the 
Court held that a school board did not have the right to prevent students 
from being exposed, in the library, to ideas with which the school board 
disagreed.120 The Court further held that “‘school officials cannot 
suppress expressions of feeling with which they do not wish to 
contend.’”121 
Similarly, the Solomon Amendment ensures that students have 
access to the military message, if they desire to hear it. The Solomon 
Amendment does not dictate what law schools may teach in the 
classroom. Law schools that attempt to block military presence at 
employment fairs is due to those law schools’ disagreement with the 
military’s policies. It is equivalent to the school board in Pico attempting 
to remove books from the library because the board disagreed with the 
books’ messages. In Pico, the Court held that a local school board has 
discretion “to add to the libraries of their schools . . . [but not] . . . the 
discretion to remove books” where the purpose is the suppression of 
ideas.122 The law schools’ barring of military recruiters was equivalent of 
what the Supreme Court held improper in Pico: the removal of an 
employer to suppress the ideas espoused by that recruiter—an attempt to 
prevent students from hearing these ideas, because the administration 
disagreed with that recruiter’s message. 
An employment fair, like a library, is dependent on students 
voluntarily seeking out a message. To the extent law schools have a right 
to instill their message and values in their students, such right may not 
extend to barring students from obtaining the message of others, 
including at an employment fair. As Pico held, to the extent the school 
administrations attempt to block students’ access to other viewpoints, it 
is the law schools, not the government, that are violating the academic 
freedom of its students. 
Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that the responsibility of 
college administrations is to protect students’ academic freedom rights, 
not those of the administration. In affording prime importance to 
students’ right to hear “a diversity of views from”123 speakers, the Court 
explained: 
The quality and creative power of student intellectual life to this 
day remains a vital measure of a school’s influence and 
attainment. For the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval 
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on particular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of 
free speech and creative inquiry in . . . its college and university 
campuses.124 
The Supreme Court has recognized, in analogous situations, that it 
is the First Amendment rights of the patrons of the institution, not the 
institution itself, which must be protected. In the context of a library, the 
Supreme Court declined to decide whether or not the library itself had a 
First Amendment right or whether, assuming one, it was violated; 
instead, it focused on whether “their patrons’ First Amendment Rights” 
had been violated, because they were the ultimate beneficiaries of free 
speech rights in a library context.125 Likewise, in the law school context, 
students are the ultimate beneficiaries, whose academic freedom rights 
are not restricted, but enhanced by being allowed to hear the views of 
diverse recruiters, including the military. 
In the corporate context, as well, the Supreme Court recognized that 
the entity’s First Amendment rights were subordinate to that of the 
corporate “members”—the shareholders. It held that SEC “regulations 
that limit management’s ability to exclude some shareholders’ views 
from corporate communications do not infringe corporate First 
Amendment rights.”126 So too, in the broadcasting context, the Court 
rejected broadcasters’ claim that their First Amendment rights were 
violated when the FCC required them to allow fair comment by any 
persons attacked by broadcasters, holding “[i]t is the right of the viewers 
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”127 
It is no answer to argue that students remain free to hear the 
message of military recruiters off campus.128 The same could have been 
said about the ability of students in Pico to go to a non-school library or 
a book store to obtain the book banned in Pico. That would not suffice 
from an academic freedom standpoint, because “[t]he school library—
sponsored, financed, and supervised by the school—is the principal locus 
of [students’] freedom” to “‘inquire, to study and to evaluate”129—just as 
the employment fair, sponsored, financed, and supervised by the school, 
is the principal locus of students’ freedom to inquire, study and evaluate 
employment opportunities. To paraphrase the Supreme Court’s 
explanation in Pico: listening to military recruiters “is completely 
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voluntary on the part of students.”130 Their selection of which recruiters 
to listen to at the law school’s employment fair “is entirely a matter of 
free choice;” the employment fairs “afford them an opportunity . . . that 
is wholly optional.”131 The Pico Court held that to the extent that the 
school administration “intended by their . . . decision to deny [students] 
access to ideas with which [the administration] disagreed, . . . then [the 
school administration] have exercised their discretion in violation of the 
Constitution.”132 A fortiori, this reasoning, applied to junior high school 
and high school students, must control the definition of academic 
freedom as to law schools’ preventing law school students from hearing 
the message of military recruiters. 
An argument that academic freedom of students is not violated by 
denial of campus facilities as long as the students can pursue their goals 
off campus, was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Healy v. 
James.133 There, a college president, opposed to the message of a student 
group, refused to allow its use of campus facilities to meet. The 
president’s conduct was held inconsistent with the need to maintain and 
protect the “marketplace of ideas” and safeguard academic freedom.134 
The ability of this student group to meet off campus did not “ameliorate 
significantly the disabilities imposed by the president’s action.”135 So 
too, the law schools’ violation of academic freedom in refusing to allow 
students to hear the military recruiters’ message on campus is not 
ameliorated by the ability of students to hear that message off campus. 
In the end, FAIR relies, for its academic freedom violation claim, 
on the undisputed rule that the government may not “discriminate against 
speech on the basis of its viewpoint.”136 In fact, no such violation of the 
law schools’ speech rights occurs because each law school can continue 
to speak freely against military policy. But, to sustain FAIR’s position 
requires a holding that the law schools can “discriminate against [the 
military’s] speech on the basis of its viewpoint” on homosexuals in the 
military. That finding would make a mockery of academic freedom, 
Thus, contrary to the assertion that the Solomon Amendment violates 
academic freedom, which was the desideratum of the Third Circuit’s 
decision, it is the law schools which are violating academic freedom and 
the Solomon Amendment which is protecting it. 
                                                                                                             
 130 Id. at 869. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 871. 
 133 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 134 Id. at 180-81. 
 135 Id. at 183. 
 136 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
2005] The Solomon Amendment Is Constitutional 27 
IV. THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT IS A PROPER EXERCISE OF 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE SPENDING CLAUSE 
As recently as 2003, in United States v. American Library Ass’n,137 
the Supreme Court held that “Congress has wide latitude to attach 
conditions to the receipt of federal assistance in order to further its policy 
objectives.”138 This was not new law, but a reaffirmation of a long-
standing rule.139 The Court explained that the only limitation on that 
power is that Congress thereby “may not ‘induce’ the recipient ‘to 
engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.’”140 That 
limitation, known as the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine”—on 
which the Third Circuit majority relied—requires a determination of 
“whether the condition that Congress requires ‘would . . . be 
unconstitutional’ if performed by the [law school] itself.”141 
Applying that test, there could be nothing unconstitutional about the 
Solomon Amendment as, without dispute, law schools would not be 
acting in an unconstitutional manner if they allowed military recruiters 
on campus. Both the Third Circuit and the district court held the 
American Library Ass’n rule inapplicable because the Solomon 
Amendment did not withhold funds from a specific spending program 
which contained the condition, but affected all funds under all programs 
run by each of the government departments.142 
With due deference to both of those courts, this exclusion of the 
government interests, as expressed in the Solomon Amendment, from the 
government’s right to condition its funding on what Congress believes is 
necessary to support government policies, is simplistic and therefore 
erroneous. Without the protection of our military forces, our government 
would not exist. In that event, no governmental department would exist, 
and thus no funding of law schools and other institutions of higher 
learning could then be given. The Constitution and Supreme Court 
decisions make clear that military recruitment—which the Solomon 
Amendment was intended to assist—is a fundamental and overriding 
public interest that has as its aim the preservation of our country’s very 
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existence.143 Hence, Congress’s conditioning of funds for learning 
institutions on law schools not impeding the government’s ability to 
recruit able persons for the military, is, in reality, related to all and each 
funding made by each government department. It cannot be that the 
Supreme Court would insist on form over substance by requiring 
Congress to include in each approval of appropriation for a funding 
program the boilerplate of “reliance on our military for the ability to 
make educational grants,” or words to that effect, in order to recognize 
that reality. Hence, under American Library Ass’n, the Solomon 
Amendment condition was constitutional. 
In any event, Congress has previously used its power of the purse to 
condition federal funding for educational institutions on compliance with 
federal policies unrelated to the specific federal funding. For example, 
Congress has conditioned federal funding on no sexual discrimination144 
and no racial discrimination.145 No one has even suggested those statutes, 
of general impact on all federal funding, are unconstitutional because 
they were not limited to the specific funding program. And although the 
anti-sexual discrimination statute barred funding by “[e]ach Federal 
department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial 
assistance to any education program”146—i.e., not related to a specific 
program—it was held constitutional.147 
Significantly, even if the lower courts were correct in holding that 
American Library Ass’n was inapplicable because the Solomon 
Amendment was not limited to a single program, the Solomon 
Amendment still should not be held to impose an unconstitutional 
condition. First, the principle inherent in American Library Ass’n, of the 
“wide latitude” that is recognized that Congress has “to attach conditions 
on the receipt of federal assistance,”148 remains the rule and, applied to 
the Solomon Amendment, makes it constitutional. 
Second, the military recruiter’s message, which the law schools 
assert is violating their First Amendment rights through forcing them to 
be associated with it, is clearly the government’s own message. In the 
recent decision Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,149 the Supreme 
Court expressly held that “the Government’s own speech . . . is exempt 
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from First Amendment scrutiny”150 in a context analogous—indeed, a 
fortiori—to that in the FAIR case. In Johanns, the plaintiffs objected to 
being required to fund advertising by a private sector group, but for the 
government’s purpose and approved by the government.151 Those 
plaintiffs objected that it “unconstitutionally compel[led] [them] to 
subsidize speech to which they object,”152 and provide “their seeming 
endorsement to promote a message with which they do not agree.”153 
Similarly, the FAIR plaintiffs objected to being compelled to provide 
room, staff and services to the military speech to which they objected, 
and thus, they claim, appear to endorse it. Noting that all prior “First 
Amendment challenges to . . . compelled expression” had not involved 
“government compelled subsidy of the government’s own speech,”154 the 
Court held those prior decisions irrelevant where it is government speech 
asserted to violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Given that 
recent decision, the FAIR plaintiffs may not object to military recruiters, 
i.e., government speech, on campus as a violation of plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment rights. 
Third, the four cases155 on which the majority in the Third Circuit 
relied, to hold the Solomon Amendment to be an unconstitutional 
condition, are inapposite; they each involved direct sanction for, or 
restriction of, speech. In Perry v. Sindermann,156 the administration of a 
state junior college declined to renew a professor’s contract, due to, he 
asserted, his exercise of his free speech right in “his testimony before 
legislative committees and his other statements critical of the Regents’ 
policies.”157 Speiser v. Randall158 likewise involved denial of a benefit 
(there, a tax exemption) “for engaging in certain speech.”159 Rosenberger 
v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia160 also involved a 
state university’s administration penalizing a student organization 
because of its viewpoint. 
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The fourth case cited by the Third Circuit majority, FCC v. League 
of Women Voters,161 expressly conditioned receipt of federal funds by 
non-commercial broadcasting stations on their not expressing their 
opinions in broadcasting, i.e., imposing a direct prohibition on “a form of 
speech—namely the expression of editorial opinion—that lies at the 
heart of First Amendment protection.”162 Indeed, the Court described 
what was at stake in that case as “the liberty to discuss publicly . . . . 
Freedom of discussion.”163 
Unlike what was found unconstitutional in each of these four cases, 
the Solomon Amendment does not prohibit law schools from expressing 
their opinion on military policy or otherwise penalize the law schools for 
their speech or expression of views. Indeed, the right of all law schools 
to speak out against military policy is unaffected by the Solomon 
Amendment.164 
It is ironic that the Third Circuit majority should purport to rely on 
these four cases because the rationale of those opinions is the antithesis 
of the law schools’ position on the Solomon Amendment: that they have 
the right to prevent their students from exercising their academic 
freedom to listen to the views of military recruiters if the students wanted 
to do so. 
For example, to paraphrase the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Rosenberger, the law schools’ “denial of [the military’s] request for 
[equal treatment] . . . is based upon viewpoint discrimination.”165  And 
“[f]or the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular 
viewpoints of its students”—such as those who wish to hear the 
military’s message—“risks the suppression of free speech and creative 
inquiry in one of the vital centers for the nation’s intellectual life, its 
college and university campuses.”166 
Each of those four cases held unconstitutional an actual restraint on 
speech. The FAIR plaintiffs do not claim that the Solomon Amendment 
imposes any restraint of anyone’s speech. Rather, they claim that the law 
schools’ right of association is violated by the Solomon Act, which, they 
say, pressures the law schools into associating with, and thus endorsing, 
the military policies with which they disagree, merely by allowing 
military recruiters to be one of many employers appearing on campus to 
be interviewed by those students who wish to sign up. 
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Also, in Speiser, the Supreme Court, in holding unconstitutional a 
loyalty oath as a condition to obtain a tax exemption, explained that a 
loyalty oath has been held constitutional where “there was no attempt 
directly to control speech but rather to protect . . . some interest clearly 
within the sphere of governmental concern. . . . [i.e.,] a congressional 
purpose . . . to achieve an objective other than restraint of speech.”167 No 
one disputes that the Solomon Amendment’s purpose was not to restrain 
speech—indeed the Third Circuit majority so assumed168—but to further 
an interest clearly within the sphere of governmental concern: military 
recruitment, which, as previously shown,169 is necessary to the 
preservation of our country. FAIR conceded that the “government’s 
interest in raising an army is important, even compelling . . . and so, too, 
we can presume is its interest in hiring JAG lawyers.”170 And, as 
previously discussed,171 the Solomon Amendment does not in any way 
limit each law school’s freedom to make clear its opposition to military 
policies. 
The Third Circuit held itself bound, by the Supreme Court decision 
in Dale, to give conclusive deference to the law schools’ assertion that 
the presence of military recruiters on campus would impair the law 
schools’ non-discrimination message.172 To the contrary, Dale made 
explicit that a mere assertion of an associational rights violation is not 
sufficient to require a finding to that effect: 
[T]he freedom of expressive association . . . is not absolute.173 
and 
That is not to say that an expressive association can erect a shield 
. . . simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a 
particular group would impair its message.174 
Rather, to paraphrase the Dale opinion, it would have impact on a statute 
only if “the forced inclusion of [a military recruiter] would significantly 
affect the [law schools’] ability to advocate public or private 
viewpoints.”175 Thus, the Solomon Amendment does not impose an 
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impact because law schools continue to be free to voice their objections 
to military policies. 
In addition, both practical knowledge and controlling Supreme 
Court authority reject the argument that law schools, by allowing 
military recruiters, among a multitude of other recruiters, to interview 
students on campus, create a message that those law schools are 
endorsing the military. No law student (and for that matter no employer) 
believes that a law school is endorsing any particular employer by 
arranging for many employers to interview students on campus. For 
example, recruiters may interview on behalf of the National Organization 
for Women (pro-abortion) as well as on behalf of an anti-abortion legal 
group, obviously without any suggestion of endorsement of either 
position. Can you imagine a law school agreeing that it endorses each 
employer that interviewed on campus, and thus is liable to a student who 
suffered financial loss after accepting an employment offer from an 
employer who became bankrupt before the employment commenced? Of 
course not; and students who have found themselves in this unfortunate 
situation (which has occurred) have never even suggested that the law 
school was at fault. There is no reason to treat military recruiters’ 
participation in employment fairs any differently. 
It would defy logic for anyone to contend that any law school 
would be taken as endorsing the policies espoused by a pro-life or a pro-
choice speaker, invited to speak on campus and permitted to use school 
facilities, including the room in which to speak, the school bulletin board 
to announce the speech, and, often, school funds allotted for such 
speakers. Likewise, it defies logic to assume that anyone believes that a 
law school endorses the policies of any specific employer among the 
hundreds seeking the opportunity to be interviewed by any students who 
wish to hear the employer’s message. 
The Supreme Court has itself recognized that no endorsement of the 
military message comes from allowing the military recruiters equal 
access to students. In Rosenberger, on which the Third Circuit relied, the 
Supreme Court declared: 
A holding that the University may not discriminate based on the 
viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not 
restrict the University’s own speech . . . . The distinction between 
the University’s own favored message and the private speech of 
students is evident . . . .176 
The Supreme Court necessarily found that no violation of associational 
rights of a school results from allowing students the option to hear, in 
                                                                                                             
 176 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995). 
2005] The Solomon Amendment Is Constitutional 33 
school, a message with which the school administration disagrees, even 
though the school provides the space, pays for it, and provides the staff 
to run it. In Pico,177 the school was required to allow students the option 
to read books in the school library, even though the school administration 
disagreed with the message of certain books. It was a given that the 
school facilities (the library) would be used, paid for by the school, and 
that school staff operated the library. Yet, no violation of any 
associational right of the schools was found. 
So too, in Healy v. James,178 the decision of the president of a 
college to bar a student group from using campus facilities to convey its 
message, because the president did not want the college associated with 
that message, was held unconstitutional. And, to paraphrase the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Widmar v. Vincent, “[i]n light of the large number of 
[recruiters] meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw 
any reasonable inference of University support from the mere fact of a 
campus meeting place.”179 
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion even as to high 
school students, who are, by definition, less mature than the college and 
graduate students affected by the Solomon Amendment, stating: 
We think that secondary school students are mature enough and 
are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support 
. . . speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis. 180 
In analogous, but non-school, situations, the Supreme Court has 
held that no endorsement of views exists when an entity gives access to 
its premises for the expression of a differing view. In PruneYard 
Shopping Center v. Robins,181 the Supreme Court rejected the 
suggestion—similar to that made by FAIR in attacking the Solomon 
Amendment as unconstitutional—that the First Amendment association 
rights of a shopping center owner would be violated by being compelled 
to allow individuals to express themselves on its property. In reasoning 
which appears directly applicable to the attack on the Solomon 
Amendment and the presence of the military on campus, the Supreme 
Court explained: 
The views expressed by members of the public in passing out 
pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition . . . will not likely 
be identified with those of the owner. . . . [Also the owner] can 
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expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply 
posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers 
stand.182 
The law schools are able to disavow any agreement or connection with 
the military recruiters, and have in fact done so,183 thereby avoiding any 
association with the military’s views. 
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that television cable system operators, if required 
to carry certain broadcast stations, would be associated with the ideas of 
those stations: 
Given cable’s long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast 
signals, there appears little risk that cable viewers would assume 
that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas 
or messages endorsed by the cable operator.184 
Rationally, no difference exists between employers allowed to convey 
their respective message on campus and broadcast stations being able to 
convey their respective message on cable. 
Significantly, the Court appears unanimous that an institution does 
not become associated with the message of any one of many allowed to 
present themselves to students. For example, to quote the dissenting 
opinion of the four “liberal” justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and 
Stevens) in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (altered only to apply that 
dissenting opinion to law schools): 
[I]t is not likely that [any law school] would be understood to 
send any message . . . simply by admitting someone as a 
[recruiter]. . . . The notion that an organization of that size and 
enormous prestige implicitly endorses the views that each of 
those [recruiters] may express . . . is simply mind boggling.185 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston186 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,187 in which the Supreme 
Court upheld the associational rights of organizations to exclude views 
with which the organization disagreed, are inapposite to the Solomon 
Amendment, contrary to the Third Circuit’s reliance on them. The 
plaintiff in Hurley, an homosexual, objected to being excluded from a 
parade, which was limited to those who agreed with the organizer’s 
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message. The parade organizer’s position was no different from what the 
response would be by a Democratic Party parade in rejecting a 
Republican seeking to participate. The Court held that the parade 
organization was not “merely ‘a conduit’ for the speech of participants in 
the parade,” but “itself a speaker.”188 In that parade context, an 
homosexual’s “participation would likely be perceived as having resulted 
from the [sponsor’s] customary determination about a unit admitted to 
the parade, that its message was worthy of presentation and quite 
possible of support as well.”189 No such perception would be warranted 
from military recruiters’ appearance on campus, as it is recognized that 
the purpose of employment fairs is not for the law school to convey an 
overall message, but an opportunity for students to hear the employment 
messages of each recruiter. 
The Boy Scouts in Dale excluded an homosexual who sought a 
special leadership role as an assistant scoutmaster, thereby compromising 
the Boy Scouts’ message on homosexuality.190 At employment fairs, in 
contrast, no special position is given to any one of many recruiters, and 
no recruiter is an official or representative of the school. 
This analysis establishes that the Solomon Amendment does not 
infringe law schools’ freedom of speech or associational rights. But, even 
assuming, arguendo, that the Solomon Amendment “does work some 
slight infringement on [law schools’] right of expressive association, that 
infringement is justified because it serves the State’s compelling 
interest.”191 The Supreme Court has stated that an infringement “may be 
justified by [statutes and] regulations adopted to serve compelling state 
interests, unrelated to the suppression of idea, that cannot be achieved 
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”192 
As noted above,193 Congress found that the military’s recruitment efforts 
would be impeded without equal access to students in law schools’ 
employment fairs, in a location (often the campus itself) convenient to all 
students. Thus, “even if enforcement of the [Solomon Amendment] 
causes some incidental abridgement of . . . protected speech, that effect is 
no greater than necessary to accomplish the [government’s] legitimate 
purposes,”194 rendering it constitutional. 
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The Third Circuit majority declined to apply these authorities 
because the government had not “produce[d] any evidence that [the 
Solomon Amendment] is no more than necessary to further the 
government’s interest.”195 But there is no requirement in these 
circumstances that the government need disprove that other solutions 
would meet the government’s need with lesser effect on First 
Amendment rights and with equal effectiveness. Otherwise “the 
undoubted ability of lawyers and judges,” who are not budgetarily 
constrained as Congress is, “to imagine some kind of less drastic or 
restrictive an approach would make it impossible to write laws that deal 
with the harm that called the statute into being.”196 
Contrary to the Third Circuit majority position, there have been 
many cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld legislation or 
regulations without requiring a factual presentation beyond legislative 
history. For example, in United States v. O’Brien,197 the Court sustained 
legislation against draft card burning, on the basis of Congress’s say-so 
that it was destructive of the Selective Service system, without extrinsic 
evidence. In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,198 the Court 
upheld a regulation against overnight camping based on the Park 
Service’s judgment that it would protect parks against damage, without 
any evidentiary showing that overnight camping would damage the park. 
Indeed, the Court found that the regulation’s “narrow[] focus[] on the 
Government’s substantial interest” was “apparent” from the face of the 
regulation.199 It continued, to hold otherwise would require delegating 
“the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as the manager of 
the Nation’s parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge 
how much protection of park lands is wise . . .”—a power the Court 
rejected.200  And in United States v. Albertini201—particularly relevant 
because it involved legislation furthering military security—the Court 
accepted Congress’s judgment on the need to give military base 
                                                                                                             
impact on the [school’s] operation,” but such limitation on religious liberty is justified 
“‘by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.’” Id. 
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982)). 
 195 FAIR, 390 F.3d 219, 246 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 196 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 841 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). Accord, Ill. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could 
not come up with something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any 
situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.”). 
 197 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 198 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
 199 Id. at 296. 
 200 Id. at 299. 
 201 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). 
2005] The Solomon Amendment Is Constitutional 37 
commanding officers the right to bar entry to a base, again without any 
extrinsic evidence. Rather, it rejected the idea—espoused by the Third 
Circuit in FAIR—that “regulations [are] invalid simply because there is 
some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on 
speech.”202 
The Third Circuit majority ignored these instructions against 
judicial second-guessing of legislative decisions by proposing alternate 
solutions for military recruiting needs, such as “loan repayment programs 
[or] television and radio advertisements.”203 But, as the above authorities 
declare, courts are not supposed to substitute their views as to what 
legislation should be for Congress’s actual decision, particularly as the 
Third Circuit admitted that its substitute proposal “may be more 
costly.”204 Further, the Third Circuit ignored the doubtlessly correct logic 
that a military recruitment program focused on a limited target audience 
of students already interested, at a known time and location, is more 
effective than an unfocused general public one. Thus, logic, not some 
unidentified evidence, is all that is needed to conclude that any 
alternative to on-campus recruiting would not likely be as successful: if 
on-campus recruiting were not the best way, law schools would not 
schedule employment fairs, and employers would not come on-campus 
for that purpose. 
It is thus apparent that the Solomon Amendment is not 
unconstitutional but a proper exercise of Congress’s spending powers. 
V. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY, NOT STRICT SCRUTINY, 
IS THE PROPER STANDARD TO CONSIDER THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT 
Because the Solomon Amendment does not violate the law schools’ 
First Amendment rights, and, to the extent of any violation, it is de 
minimus in comparison to the important government purpose furthered 
by it, the Solomon Amendment is constitutional under any standard of 
scrutiny applied to it. 
In fact, the Third Circuit was in error in applying strict scrutiny,205 
thereby disagreeing with the district court’s choice of intermediate 
scrutiny,206 pursuant to United States v. O’Brien.207 The Third Circuit 
held that O’Brien applied only when an activity does not involve “speech 
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proper and is not protected under other First Amendment grounds,”208 
referring to expressive conduct. As shown above, the Solomon 
Amendment does not restrict law schools’ free speech. And, as no one 
could conclude that a law school endorses any particular employer 
merely because it is permitted to participate in an employment fair, no 
association rights of the law schools are implicated. 
But, even if it were concluded that free speech rights were infringed 
by the Solomon Amendment, it would not preclude application of 
intermediate scrutiny. Contrary to the Third Circuit’s holding, O’Brien is 
applicable to situations in which legislation infringes free speech. 
Indeed, O’Brien itself was an attack on the constitutionality of the 
anti-draft card burning statute on the ground that it violated the plaintiff’s 
free speech rights. There was no dispute that O’Brien burned his draft 
card to express his opinion against the Vietnam War—i.e., an exercise of 
free speech. Yet, O’Brien applied the intermediate scrutiny standard and 
upheld the statute’s constitutionality.209 
The attack on the Solomon Amendment is analogous to the attack 
on the law prohibiting draft card burning in O’Brien. Both the anti-draft 
card burning law and the Solomon Amendment have many “purposes 
[that] would be defeated”210 by their violation without consideration of 
the speech that may be incidentally restricted (whether protesting the 
Vietnam War or “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”). Also, in both cases Congress 
had a “legitimate and substantial interest in preventing” violation of these 
two laws.211 In O’Brien, the Court held that “when ‘speech’ and 
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech 
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms,”212 if “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression.”213 
If the undisputed impact on draft card burners’ free speech rights in 
O’Brien was subject to intermediate, not strict, scrutiny, clearly any 
questionable impact on law schools’ free speech rights in FAIR must also 
call for intermediate scrutiny. 
Other Supreme Court decisions similarly did not apply strict 
scrutiny even though the statute in question was conceded to infringe on 
free speech. For example, the Court in United States v. Albertini, relied 
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on O’Brien to uphold the constitutionality of a statute despite 
recognizing the “burden on speech” that occurred.214 
The Court in O’Brien allowed the obvious functions served by the 
Selective Service cards to be sufficient evidence of its legitimate 
purpose.215 Thus, it is inappropriate for the Third Circuit to have 
demanded extra evidence beyond the obvious purpose of improving 
military recruiting that Congress has determined to be served by the 
Solomon Amendment. 
The Supreme Court has further held that: 
courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive 
judgments of Congress . . . Sound policymaking often requires 
legislators to forecast future events and to anticipate the likely 
impact of these events based on deductions and inferences for 
which complete empirical support may be unavailable. As an 
institution, moreover, Congress is far better equipped than the 
judiciary to “amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data”. . . .216 
The Third Circuit ignored this precedent by demanding that Congress 
provide more evidence than is present in the legislative history and by 
discounting Congress’s determination that the Solomon Amendment is 
an effective way of fulfilling Congress’s goals. The Third Circuit 
usurped the Congressional role and performed evaluations about which 
the Supreme Court has held the judiciary to be inadequately equipped to 
make. 
The Third Circuit, while selecting the strict scrutiny standard, also 
held that its ruling would not be different under intermediate scrutiny. In 
purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny, the Third Circuit did not 
dispute that the Solomon Amendment fulfills three of the four asserted 
criteria for constitutionality. That court’s dispute was limited to whether 
the Solomon Amendment infringes on First Amendment rights more than 
is essential.217 This purported application of intermediate scrutiny is 
essentially strict scrutiny disguised, because the court applied the strict 
scrutiny standard that, since a less restrictive measure can be imagined, 
the regulation must be unconstitutional. 
Intermediate scrutiny does not require the statute be the least-
restrictive means of accomplishing the government’s goals.218 Rather, a 
statute satisfies the narrowly tailored requirement and the “incidental 
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burden on speech is no greater than is essential . . . so long as the neutral 
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be 
achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”219 Other Circuits have 
applied this application of intermediate scrutiny. For example, in Casey 
v. City of Newport, Rhode Island,220 the First Circuit described a 
regulation as valid that “promoted a substantial government interest . . . 
that would have been achieved less effectively absent the regulation, and 
. . . did so without burdening substantially more speech than 
necessary.”221 Therefore, if the scrutiny standard would affect the 
determination, intermediate scrutiny should have been applied. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Solomon Amendment does not infringe academic freedom nor 
violate the Spending Clause. Rather, the Solomon Amendment serves the 
important purpose of establishing and maintaining a capable military, a 
duty of Congress under Article I. Also, it enhances academic freedom of 
students by conditioning the grant of federal funds on permitting students 
the right to choose to hear the military recruiter’s message. The Third 
Circuit decision depends on an erroneous finding that the Solomon 
Amendment violates the First Amendment, which it does not, and, if at 
all, certainly not to the extent that it overcomes Congress’s valid purpose 
in enacting it. 
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